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Abstract 
 
The integration of medical devices in everyday life 
prompts the idea that these devices will increasingly 
have evidential value in civil and criminal 
proceedings. However, the investigation of these 
devices presents new challenges for the digital forensics 
community. Previous research has shown that mobile 
devices provide investigators with a wealth of 
information. Hence, mobile devices that are used within 
medical environments potentially provide an avenue for 
investigating and analyzing digital evidence from such 
devices.  
The research contribution of this paper is twofold. 
First, it provides an empirical analysis of the viability of 
using information from smartphone applications 
developed to complement a medical device, as digital 
evidence. Second, it includes documentation on the 
artifacts that are potentially useful in a digital forensics 
investigation of smartphone applications that interact 
with medical devices.    
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
The integration of information technology into 
medical settings introduces a variety of opportunities 
and challenges from security and investigation 
perspectives. Medical devices such as ventilators, 
pacemakers and infusion pumps, which initially 
operated as standalone devices, now integrate network 
technology that permits communication with a variety 
of connected healthcare systems [1]. This integration 
has resulted in several benefits including improved 
patient safety, reduced workloads for medical 
professionals, and the increased generation of medical 
data [2, 3].  
According to Qualcomm Life [4, 5], next-generation 
medical devices will produce and collect vast amounts 
of medical and patient information. For example, a 
typical ventilator is expected to generate almost 305 
data parameters per second, which includes patient 
information, therapy details, and device operation 
metadata [4, 5]. Based on these predictions, a Stanford 
Medicine report goes on to estimate that the medical 
industry will generate 2,314 exabytes of data by 2020 
[6]. From a digital forensics’ perspective, medical 
device data could provide a forensic investigator with a 
wealth of potential evidence.  
Previous research indicates that digital evidence is 
becoming increasingly important in a variety of legal 
situations [7-9]. Hence, it is only a matter of time before 
medical device data becomes prominent in civil and 
criminal cases. Support for these predictions is already 
evident in criminal cases in the United States. For 
example, in Middletown Ohio, law enforcement 
investigators issued a search warrant to collect 
information from an individual’s pacemaker [10]. This 
information was then used to charge the individual with 
a variety of crimes, including arson. Similarly, a court 
in Pennsylvania admitted evidence from a fitness watch 
device to support charges of false reports to law 
enforcement, false alarms to public safety, and 
tampering with evidence [11]. However, the digital 
evidence was only analyzed by investigators after the 
defendant provided their username and password.  
Hence, defendants who do not provide device 
authentication information introduce additional barriers 
for digital forensic investigators. Consequently, 
researchers have speculated that the collection and 
analysis, of residual data from medical devices, are 
unlikely to be straightforward [2]. The underlying 
problem is the absence of digital forensic consideration 
in the design of medical products, introducing 
uncertainty as to the viability of conventional 
approaches to forensic evidence acquisition in medical 
environments [2]. 
Traditionally, when a storage device is involved in a 
crime, the equipment is seized to obtain an accurate 
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copy of the data stored on the device for later analysis 
[12]. Typically, devices connect to an investigator’s 
computer via a write-blocker. An investigator then 
creates a byte-for-byte copy (an image) of the entire 
storage device using commercial software tools, such as 
FTK or Encase, or an open source alternative like ‘dd’. 
During the analysis phase of an investigation, an 
investigator appraises the significance of extracted 
information artifacts. The investigator then develops a 
narrative based on the extracted residual data and 
constructs a timeline using the data to explain how a 
crime was potentially committed. Where appropriate, it 
may also be necessary to associate particular artifacts 
with one or more user IDs. Evidence recovered from 
traditional storage media (e.g., documents, images, 
multimedia files, and metadata) is known to assist with 
this type of analysis. However, it is not clear that the 
residual data recovered from medical devices and their 
associated applications will support similar analysis 
activities. The overall lack of clarity is due to the variety 
of medical devices available in the market in 
conjunction with the deficiency of knowledge about the 
‘forensic-ability’ (i.e., the existence and availability of 
timestamp information and relevant metadata) of 
medical device evidence. 
One medical device that has received particular 
attention in the past twelve months is the Kardia Mobile 
[13-15]. Kardia is a hand-held single-lead 
Electrocardiography (ECG) device that utilizes a 
smartphone to detect and monitor Atrial Fibrillation 
(AF) [15]. From a safety perspective, Kardia and its 
associated smartphone application are approved for use 
by both the United States Food And Drug 
Administration and the European Union [16]. The 
device is intended to assist medical professionals in the 
treatment of patients with known or suspected heart 
conditions, such as AF [15, 16].  
The increased usage of residual data in court cases 
in conjunction with recent legal activities supports the 
idea that approved medical devices, such as the Kardia, 
will escalate in importance in legal contexts. It is also 
realistic to speculate that as network connectivity and 
digital functionality increase in medical devices, that 
these devices will increasingly become cybersecurity 
targets. This line of thought prompts the hypothesis that 
a medical device smartphone application can provide 
forensically relevant data. To address the hypothesis, 
the following questions were proposed:  
• Can metadata, concerning a patient and their use 
of the medical device be recovered from a 
smartphone application?  
• Can medical information be recovered from an 
accompanying smartphone application?  
The research contribution of this paper is twofold. 
First, it provides an empirical analysis of the viability of 
using information from smartphone applications 
developed to complement a medical device, as evidence 
in legal cases. Second, it provides documentation on the 
artifacts that are potentially useful in a digital forensics 
investigation of smartphone applications that interact 
with medical devices. This paper is structured as 
follows. Section two discusses relevant previous 
research related to medical devices and smartphone 
forensics. Section three presents the experiment design 
implemented in this research. Section four reports the 
experimental findings, and a discussion of the results. 
Finally, Section five draws conclusions from the work 
conducted and presents ideas for future research.  
 
2. Related Work 
 
Researchers are continuously demonstrating that 
medical devices are at risk from a security perspective 
[17-21]. Malasri and Wang [17] examined the insecurity 
of implantable medical devices, such as pacemakers. 
These researchers argue that implantable medical 
devices are susceptible to a variety of attacks including 
eavesdropping, patient tracking, and spoofing. They 
concluded that a malicious attacker could, in theory, 
cause direct physical harm to an individual by sending 
malicious commands to compromise the security of 
such devices.  Glisson et al. [18] examined the viability 
of compromising a medical mannequin, in a live 
hospital environment. In addition to demonstrating two 
types of brute force attacks, these researchers also 
explained how a medical mannequin is vulnerable to a 
denial of service attack. Li et al. [19] focused their 
research on a diabetes therapy device and reported that 
some medical devices transmit patient and device 
information in plaintext. After analyzing transmitted 
information, they reported that they were able to recover 
device passwords and network data packets containing 
dosage information. 
Growing security concerns with medical devices 
have prompted the application of increased regulatory 
pressure on healthcare organizations to require forensic 
investigation capabilities [22]. Digital forensics is 
concerned with the collection, analysis, and 
admissibility of collected data in a legal context [23]. 
Forensic investigations attempt to establish answers to 
five key questions, known as the five W’s: what, why, 
who, when, and where [23]. From a medical device 
perspective, researchers have raised concerns regarding 
the forensic investigation of such devices [1, 2, 18, 24, 
25].  
Grispos et al. [2] argue that in order to answer the 
five W’s, investigators rely on the residual data from 
devices and systems involved in a crime. However, they 
speculate that such data might not always be available 
within medical devices, and as a result, investigators 
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might not be able to identify suspects or facts within an 
investigation. In line with these thoughts, Glisson et al. 
[18] indicated that the digital forensics community 
required further research to identify medical device 
residual data, which could be used in a forensic 
investigation.  
Cusack and Kyaw [1] proposed an alternative 
network-centric solution based on the integration of 
forensic capabilities during the development of medical 
devices and systems. They proposed a forensically-
ready hospital wireless network architecture but do not 
attempt to address residual data generated by medical 
devices. Ellouze et al. [24] focused on the type of 
evidence that is needed in medical device investigations, 
including data collected from sensor nodes, mobile 
devices, wireless medical devices, databases, and third-
party applications. In later work, Ellouze et al. [25] 
proposed a theoretical investigation framework to help 
guide a post-mortem analysis of implantable medical 
devices. Part of this solution involves developing a set 
of techniques to assist with the secure storage of 
evidence logs on mobile devices, which can be used to 
track sensitive medical events.  
When mobile devices are used within medical 
environments, they potentially provide an avenue for 
investigating and analyzing digital evidence. Mobile 
device forensics is defined as “the science of recovering 
digital evidence from a mobile device under forensically 
sound conditions using acceptable methods” [26]. From 
a digital forensics perspective, a mobile device can be 
considered a treasure trove of forensic evidence [27-29]. 
A study by Glisson et al. [27] involving the analysis of 
49 low-end devices acquired from second-hand 
markets, recovered more than 11,000 artifacts. 
However, the advancement of smartphones has resulted 
in the generation of richer artifacts such as web-
browsing activities, third-party application data and 
GPS coordinates [28]. As a result, several researchers 
have focused their efforts on understanding the residual 
artifacts generated on smartphone devices.  
Grispos et al. [30, 31] and Martini et al. [32] 
analyzed mobile cloud storage applications on Android 
and iOS devices. This analysis included the 
identification of data and metadata, along with their 
locations on the mobile device. Al Mutawa et al. [33] 
examined social networking applications, such as 
Facebook, Twitter, and MySpace, on Android, iOS, and 
Blackberry devices. While minimal artifacts could be 
recovered from Blackberry devices, the researchers 
observed that evidentiary artifacts concerning these 
applications could be recovered from Android and iOS-
based devices. Anglano [34] focused on examining the 
artifacts generated by users who use the communication 
application, WhatsApp. The findings from this research 
show that artifacts could be recovered from databases, 
which can be used to reconstruct the list of contacts and 
the chronology of the messages that have been 
exchanged between users. Badar and Baggili [35] 
examined the logical backup generated from an Apple 
iPhone when connected to iTunes, with the goal of using 
this backup as a source of forensic artifacts. Using this 
approach, Badar and Baggili [35] recovered a variety of 
iPhone-related artifacts including the device’s address 
book, incoming and outgoing call logs, text messages, 
email account information, and internet browser history. 
Levinson et al. [28] examined partitions on an iPhone 
device with the aim of identifying residual data from 
built-in applications. From an artifact perspective, 
Levinson et al. [28] recovered user account information, 
timestamps, geolocation information, contacts and 
multimedia files from the device. 
In addition to the above applications and operating 
systems, researchers have focused on the examination 
of Mobile Health (mHealth) and well-being 
applications. Plachkinova et al. [36] focused on the 
security and privacy of 38 Android and iOS mHealth 
applications with the objective of developing a 
taxonomy based on security and privacy issues 
identified from the applications. Kharrazi et al. [37] 
examined nineteen mHealth applications on iOS, 
Blackberry, and Android devices and reported that 
seven of the evaluated applications did not implement 
security features such as password protection and user 
authentication. From a forensics perspective, Azfar et al. 
[38] examined 40 Android mHealth applications and 
proposed a forensic taxonomy that comprises databases, 
user credentials, personal details of users, user activities, 
user location, activity timestamps, and images. While 
previous research has examined residual, security and 
privacy issues in medical devices and mHealth 
applications, minimal research examines the generation 
of smartphone application residual data as a 
consequence of interacting with a medical device. 
 
3. Experiment Design  
 
In order to answer the hypothesis and associated 
research questions identified in the introduction, a 
controlled experiment was undertaken [39]. This 
controlled experiment consisted of five stages. The five 
stages included: 1) preparing a smartphone device for 
use in the experiment; 2) installing the Kardia 
application onto a smartphone device and setting up a 
test account for use in the experiment; 3) using the 
Kardia application and the Kardia Mobile ECG device; 
4) processing the smartphone device using 
MicroSystemation (MSAB) XRY; and 5) using forensic 
tools to extract files and artifacts from the extraction 
dumps.   
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The mobile device forensic toolkit used in this 
experiment was MSAB’s XRY version 7.7 and its 
associated analysis tool, XAMN version 3.2 [40]. Files 
and artifacts associated with the Kardia application were 
then extracted from the memory dumps using XAMN 
and analyzed further using AccessData Forensic Toolkit 
(FTK) version 6.3 [41]. These tools were chosen based 
on practicality and availability to the authors.  
Two smartphone devices were included in this 
experiment: a Samsung Galaxy S4 and an Apple iPhone 
SE (hereafter referred to as the devices). Table 1 - 
Smartphone Devices, presents an overview of these 
devices, their features and storage capabilities. These 
devices were selected based on their compatibility with 
the XRY forensic toolkit that was used to extract a 
memory dump of the device’s internal memory. In 
addition, the Android and iOS operating systems 
executed on the devices represent the two most popular 
smartphone operating systems, at the time of the 
research [42]. A number of smartphone devices fulfill 
these criteria and could have been used in the research. 
The decision to use these specific devices was based on 
availability.  
 
Feature Galaxy S4 iPhone SE 
Model 
Number 
SGH-i337 A1662 
Operating 
System 
Android v. 5.0 
(Lollipop) 
iOS v. 11.3.1 
Storage 
Capacity 
16 GB 32 GB 
Table 1: Smartphone Devices 
The smartphone application used in this experiment 
was Kardia version 5.1.2, for both Android and iOS 
operating systems. The following steps were undertaken 
to prepare the devices and applications for the 
experiment. These steps were executed for both the 
Android and iOS smartphone devices.  
1. The device was ‘hard reset’ to remove any 
previous data. This involved restoring the factory 
settings on the device. A desktop computer was 
used to create, depending on the device, a Google 
or Apple account. The device was then powered-
on, and the account was used to complete the 
initial device setup. All default device setup 
options were selected during this initial process.  
2. The device was then connected to a wireless 
network, which was used to gain access to the 
Internet. The Kardia application was downloaded 
and installed using the device’s respective 
application store (Google Play and the Apple 
App Store). The default installation and security 
parameters were used during the installation of 
the application. The Kardia application was 
executed, and a new profile was created using an 
email address created for the purpose of the 
experiment and a common password. The profile 
information recorded included: first name, last 
name, date of birth, height, gender, and smoker 
status. Test information was used for the purpose 
of completing the profile. After the initial setup, 
the default settings were used on the Kardia 
application. This included settings for restricting 
an ECG recording to thirty seconds, permitting 
voice notes and enabling a thirty-day premium 
service trial.  
3. After the Kardia application setup was 
completed, the application was used to record an 
initial measurement using the Kardia Mobile 
device. This initial measurement is required 
before the Kardia Mobile and application can be 
used by a patient. The measurement is recorded 
and then submitted to a medical professional by 
the application, on behalf of the patient. After a 
notification was received that the initial 
recording was successful, the Kardia Mobile and 
the application were then used twice a day for 
five days. The date and time of each recording, 
along with the ‘result’ provided on the 
smartphone interface by the Kardia application 
were documented for future reference. In 
addition to recording ECG measurements, the 
smartphone application interface was also used to 
manually record blood pressure recordings and 
weight information. Test information was used 
for the purpose of these measurements, which 
were documented for future analysis.  
4. Upon completion of the five-day period, the 
smartphone device was processed using the XRY 
toolkit to create a memory dump of its internal 
memory. In the case of the Galaxy S4, the device 
was processed to create a ‘Physical Acquisition’ 
of the internal memory. This extraction process 
first involved activating the ‘USB Debugging’ 
option on the smartphone device. A step-by-step 
wizard provided instructions on how to prepare 
the device for the extraction, and a number of 
forensic programs were then loaded onto the 
smartphone. The Galaxy S4’s internal memory 
was then read, and a memory dump was saved to 
a folder on the desktop of a forensic workstation. 
The entire process took approximately forty 
minutes. 
The extraction process for the Apple SE differed 
from that of the Galaxy S4. In the case of the 
Apple SE, only a ‘Full Read Logical’ extraction 
was possible using the XRY forensic toolkit. 
Nonetheless, this type of extraction can still be 
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used to recover the Kardia application folder 
located within the User partition on the Apple 
Device. A step-by-step wizard provided 
instructions on how to prepare the device for the 
logical acquisition. The resulting extraction was 
then saved on the desktop of a forensic 
workstation. The entire process took 
approximately fifteen minutes. 
5. The subsequent forensic extractions that were 
created using the XRY were then loaded in 
XAMN, where the Android and iOS file systems 
were reconstructed. The analysis techniques used 
to locate files and artifacts related to the Kardia 
application included: string searching, text 
filtering, and browsing the respective file 
systems. Files and artifacts were also extracted 
from the memory dumps using XMAN and 
analyzed further using FTK. 
The scope of this research is restricted in the 
following ways. The experiment was conducted in the 
United States (US) using devices that contain network 
software for carrier providers in the US. The experiment 
was executed only once on each device. The experiment 
focused on a specific version of the Android and iOS 
operating systems, a specific version of the Kardia 
application, and specific versions of XRY and FTK. 
Due to tool limitation, a Logical Extraction was the sole 
extraction method for the iOS device, while a Physical 
Extraction was the extraction method for the Android 
device. It should also be noted that the primary 
researcher was both a participant and a researcher in the 
experiment.  
 
4. Results and Discussion  
 
An analysis of the Android and iOS memory dumps 
revealed that a variety of artifacts related to the Kardia 
Mobile could be recovered from its smartphone 
application. These artifacts can be broadly categorized 
as medical-type data, patient information, and user-
generated metadata.  
 
4.1. Kardia Application on Android 
 
Within an Android device, user-related files and 
metadata are stored under the location   /data/data 
[43]. Kardia Mobile artifacts were recovered                
from an application folder called com.alivecor. 
aliveecg that was stored under the /data/data 
location. Medical-type artifacts can be recovered from 
various locations in the application folder. Within the 
high-level folder is a subfolder called Files. This 
contains various subfolders of potential interest to a 
forensic investigation. ECG files generated by the 
Kardia Mobile device can be recovered from the 
location: com.alivecor.aliveecg/files/ 
ecgs. Two ECG files are generated for each reading 
taken with the Kardia, and both files contain an .atc 
file extension. Figure 1 presents an extract of the file 
header information for these files using FTK. This file 
header information contains the date and time the 
reading was taken. It also contains the ECG reading’s 
identifier number (3db73498-32a0-4293-b5f0-
7616162c55d8), the smartphone device used to take the 
recording, and the version of Kardia Mobile. 
 
 
Figure 1: Android .ATC File Header 
An analysis of the subfolder called temp under the 
folder com.alivecor.aliveecg/files/ 
revealed PDF documents. These PDF documents 
contain any ECG recordings that are referred to a 
medical professional for further analysis. Figure 2 
presents an extract of this PDF document, which 
includes patient information, the patient’s date of birth, 
when the recording was undertaken, and the heart rate 
documented as beats per minute.  
 
 
Figure 2: PDF of ECG Recording 
In addition to the ECG recordings, audio files related 
to the recordings can be found in the location: 
com.alivecor.aliveecg/files/. These files 
are in two formats: Advanced Audio Coding (.aac) and 
MPEG 4 Audio (.m4a). The files are thirty seconds long 
and record audio sounds during the ECG recording. The 
audio file name can be used to look up the 
corresponding ECG recording using the UUID value in 
the database discussed below.  
Patient information and metadata related to the 
Kardia can be recovered from a database called 
ECG.db. This database contains thirteen tables, 
documenting various metadata and can be recovered 
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from the location: com.alivecor.aliveecg/ 
databases. The table bp_records contains 
metadata related to blood pressure recordings. This 
includes timestamp information, timestamp offsets, if 
the record is deleted or not, systolic and diastolic 
readings, the heart rate at the time of the recording and 
the source of the blood pressure recording. It must be 
noted that the timestamp information was not in the 
local time but stored as an epoch timestamp according 
to Greenwich Mean Time (GMT). As a result, the 
timestamp offset (-18000 seconds) must be applied to 
the documented timestamp to obtain the actual day and 
time associated with the recording.  
Within the ECG table, metadata related to the patient 
and their ECG recordings can be recovered. This 
metadata includes the patient’s first and last name, as 
well as their date of birth (stored as a GMT epoch 
timestamp). The table also stores information related to 
ECG readings taken using the Kardia Mobile device. 
Metadata information related to these ECG readings is 
summarized in Table 2 below.  
 
Field Name(s) Description 
uuid and 
server_id 
Recording ID numbers  
data Recorded 
Date and time that the ECG 
recording was undertaken 
duration 
Duration in milliseconds of each 
ECG recording 
heart_rate 
Patient’s heart rate in beats per 
minute 
inverted 
The position of the Kardia 
Mobile at the time of the 
reading: upside down (1) or 
correct side up (0) 
height Patient’s height in centimeters  
weight Patient’s weight in kilograms  
gender 
Patients gender: female (0) or 
male (1) 
smoker 
As entered by the patient, non-
smoker (0) or smoker (1) 
has_audio_file 
If an audio file is available (1) or 
not available (0) 
Table 2: Android ECG Recording Fields  
In addition to recovering ECG recordings, a third 
table called Orders can be used to identify which ECG 
recordings are submitted to a medical professional for 
further analysis. Metadata related to this table includes 
the ID number of the ECG recording submitted to the 
medical professional, the result sent to the patient, 
timestamp information describing when the analysis 
was requested, along with timestamp information when 
the analysis was received by the Kardia smartphone 
application.   
The fourth table within the ECG.db database that 
contains information of potential forensic interest is 
called Weight_records. The purpose of this table is 
to record the patient’s weight information, as entered 
through the Kardia application. Metadata, which can be 
recovered from this table includes timestamp 
information in epoch format (the offset must be applied 
to obtain the local timestamp), the weight in kilograms, 
the patient’s height in centimeters and the source of the 
information. An interesting observation is that the 
weight and height information recovered from the 
database tables was in kilograms and centimeters. 
However, at the time of the experiment, this information 
was input into the smartphone interface in pounds and 
feet, respectively. This would suggest that the 
smartphone application is converting this information 
from one format to another, before storing it in the 
database table.  
The Kardia application also stores patient metadata 
within Extensible Markup Language (XML) files. 
These XML files are stored in a subfolder called 
shared_prefs within the main folder located at 
com.alivecor.aliveecg/. Within shared_ 
prefs the following files and information can be 
recovered:  
• com.alivecor.aliveecg_preference
s.xml – the email account used with the Kardia 
service, timestamp information related to the last 
blood pressure recording, last weight recording 
and last heart rate recording. 
• com.google.android.gms.measureme
nt.prefs.xml – epoch timestamp 
information about when the Kardia application 
was first used.  
• userprofile.xml – the patient’s first and 
last name, the patient’s date of birth, the patient’s 
weight in kilograms, the patient’s email address, 
the patient’s country location, and the patient’s 
smoker status.  
 
4.2. Kardia Application on iOS 
  
An analysis of the iOS memory dumps revealed that 
Kardia device artifacts are stored under the location 
/private/var/mobile/containers/data/ 
application in a folder called com.alivecor. 
professional.aliveecg. The primary location 
contains two subfolders called Documents and 
Library, which contain medical-type artifacts and 
patient metadata. Unless stated, all timestamp 
Page 4281
  
information recovered from the iOS application was in 
local Mac Absolute Time format [44]. The format of this 
timestamp is the number of seconds since midnight 
January 1, 2001, GMT [44]. 
Within the Documents subfolder, are files 
containing the audio sounds detected during the ECG 
recording. These files are in the MPEG 4 Audio (.m4a) 
format. The file name of the audio file corresponds to 
the ZUUID metadata, which can be recovered from the 
AliveECGDB.sqlite database. This can be used to 
match the audio file with the corresponding ECG 
reading.  
A subfolder within Documents called ecgfiles 
contains the Kardia native .atc files for each ECG 
reading undertaken using the device. The file headers 
for the .atc files recovered from the Apple device are in 
the same format as those recovered from the Android 
device. The header information that can be recovered 
includes the data and time of the ECG recording, the 
ECG reading’s identifier and the version of iOS running 
on the Apple device used with the reading.  
The primary metadata location for the iOS   Kardia 
application is an SQLite database called 
AliveECGDB.sqlite. This database can be found in 
the Documents folder and contains various tables of 
interest to a forensic investigation. The 
ZKDMBLOODPRESSURERECORDING table found in 
the database contains the metadata associated with 
blood pressure recordings. Metadata recovered from the 
table includes the systolic and diastolic values, 
timestamp information, notes documented at the time of 
the measurement and the heart rate. The ZKDMWEIGHT 
table within the AliveECGDB. sqlite database 
contains the metadata associated with weight 
recordings. Metadata recovered from the table includes 
the patient’s height in centimeters, timestamp 
information, the patient’s weight in kilogram   s, and the 
information source or if the patient manually entered the 
information.  
Metadata associated with any ECG reading that has 
been submitted to a medical professional can be 
recovered from a table called ZOVERREADERORDER. 
Metadata recovered from this table includes the 
timestamp of when the recording was submitted for 
further analysis, timestamp information of when the 
medical professional completed their analysis, and the 
results of this analysis. In addition, the ECG recording 
ID (Z_PK) can be used to look up more information 
about the submitted recording in the ZECG table. 
The largest table within the 
AliveECGDB.sqlite database is called ZECG. 
This table contains medical information (Table 3) and 
patient metadata (Table 4) related to the ECG recordings 
undertaken using the iOS application.  
Field Name Description 
ZDATERECORDED 
Timestamp that describes 
when the ECG reading was 
undertaken 
ZHEARTRATE 
The results of the ECG 
reading undertaken with 
the Kardia, stored in beats 
per minute 
ZCOMMENT 
Text describing the audio 
recording taken at the time 
of the ECG reading 
ZFILENAME 
The file name of the .atc 
file associated with the 
ECG reading 
ZDATESYNCED 
Timestamp that describes 
when the ECG reading was 
synchronized with a 
Kardia sever 
ZDURATION_MS 
Duration of the ECG 
recording in milliseconds 
ZMC_ANGINA 
Describes if the patient has 
selected ‘Angina’ as a 
medical condition in their 
profile (1 = YES, 0 = NO) 
ZHAS_AUDIO_ 
DESCRIPTION 
Describes if the ECG 
reading includes an audio 
file (1 = YES, 0 = NO) 
ZINVERTED 
The position of the Kardia 
Mobile at the time of the 
reading: upside down (1) 
or correct side up (0) 
Z_IS_RESTING_ 
HEART_RATE 
Describes if the ECG 
reading taken was ‘at rest’ 
(1 = YES, 0 = NO) 
Table 3: iOS ECG Medical Information  
The iOS Kardia application also stores patient 
metadata within Property List (plist) files. 
These plist files are stored in a subfolder called 
Preferences within the Library folder. Within 
the Preferences subfolder, only one file contains 
forensically-relevant information called com. 
alivecor.professional.aliveecg.plist. 
This file contains the following information: 
• the patient’s first name, last name, gender and 
date of birth, 
• the patient’s height in centimeters,  
• the patient’s email address,  
• the medical conditions selected in the profile, and 
• application version and timestamp information. 
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Field Name Description 
ZUUID 
ID numbers assigned 
to each recording 
ZMALE 
Denotes if the patient 
is Male (1) or Female 
(0) 
ZPATIENTFIRSTNAME 
The patient’s first 
name, as recorded in 
the patient’s profile 
ZPATIENTLASTNAME 
The patient’s surname 
name, as recorded in 
the patient’s profile 
ZPATIENTDOB 
The patient’s date of 
birth, as recorded in 
the patient’s profile 
ZHEIGHT 
The patient’s height, 
as recorded in the 
patient’s profile 
Table 4: iOS ECG Patient Information  
4.3. Analysis Summary 
 
The results indicate that the research questions 
identified in the introduction, which focus on patient 
metadata and medical information, are acquirable 
through application data extraction analysis. The 
extracted residual data identified metadata specific to 
patients and their use of the medical device from the 
smartphone application. This metadata included the 
patient’s first and last name, the patient’s gender, the 
patient’s height and weight, along with timestamp 
information regarding when the patient undertook ECG 
and blood pressure readings. An interesting observation 
from the analysis is that some of the timestamp 
information recovered from the artifacts were in the 
local time zone, while other timestamp information was 
stored in the Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) zone. This 
scenario could potentially complicate a forensic 
investigation, especially when an investigator is 
attempting to undertake a timeline analysis to determine 
when particular events took place.  
The results from the controlled experiment have 
shown that it is possible to recover medical information 
from the Kardia Mobile application. On the Android and 
iOS devices, this medical information included heart 
rates through ECG readings, systolic and diastolic blood 
pressure readings, and PDF documents of ECG 
readings. In addition, the analysis of databases created 
by the Kardia application revealed that it was possible 
to recover medical conditions, smoker status, and audio 
recordings taken at the time of ECG readings.  
The overall analysis of the data supports the 
hypothesis that medical device smartphone applications 
can provide relevant forensic data. This statement holds 
for both the Android and iOS devices analyzed during 
the experiment. A forensic investigator could use the 
medical information and patient metadata generated by 
the Kardia application as a potential source of digital 
evidence, when an investigation requires such 
information.  
 
5. Conclusion and Future Work 
 
Digital evidence is becoming increasingly important 
in a variety of legal situations. The amalgamation of 
medical devices into everyday life is creating a scenario 
where digital evidence from these devices could 
plausibly be introduced into civil or criminal 
proceedings. Hence, there is a growing interest from 
both industry and academia to identify information that 
can be recovered from these devices that will enable it 
to be submitted as evidence to a court of law. The results 
of this preliminary research demonstrate that 
smartphone applications that interact with medical 
devices provide an avenue for obtaining digital evidence 
from these devices. The recovery of data from these 
medical device applications could be used to provide a 
forensic investigator with information about the health 
and well-being of an individual involved, or the medical 
state of an individual at a particular time. Such evidence 
could be critical in criminal investigations where foul-
play or medical malpractice is suspected.  
Future work will examine several key areas 
including analysis of other medical devices, operating 
systems and investigating medical devices themselves 
for forensic evidence. Further research will investigate 
a greater variety of medical devices and their 
accompanying smartphone applications. Further 
research would also need to consider an examination of 
smartphone applications from multiple operating 
systems.  
Future research will evaluate the results of this study 
on a larger scale. The research will be expanded to 
include the identification of storage and usage patterns 
along with the implementation of machine learning 
algorithms for the purposes of developing a user profile. 
The idea behind the digital profile development is to 
attempt to discover ways to tie individuals to profiles 
and profiles to devices.   
An additional avenue of research will investigate the 
extent to which digital evidence can be recovered from 
a medical device itself. The purpose of this research is 
to investigate the relationship between data stored in a 
smartphone application and the data stored in a physical 
medical device. In theory, the extraction of both the 
device and associated applications should provide a 
more complete dataset from the physical medical 
device. Research also needs to consider if medical 
device development should integrate forensic-by-design 
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principles in order to enhance forensic readiness and 
enable additional data collection for investigations 
involving medical devices.  
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